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I want to start my remarks by emphasizing a couple things that are par-
ticularly prudent for me to say here today. First, please understand that I am
speaking for myself and not for the Federal Reserve System. Second, and
more generally, I want to make sure, as I go through my remarks, that I am
clear that this conference has been designed for us to get these issues out on
the table and to become better informed. Although there have been
moments of tension, heated moments perhaps, I believe it has served that
purpose. I certainly have found the presentations and the discussions to be
very informative and insightful and expect you will find that to be the case
also for the speakers after me.
In listening over the course of the conference, I was struck by the variety
of interchange arrangements that exist across countries. It is difficult to
make broad generalizations, because country-specific factors are crucial in
understanding interchange and related issues as they have evolved.
Let me just say once again, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, and,
I believe, the Federal Reserve more generally, have an interest in under-
standing the functioning of the payments system. It is important to busi-
nesses and consumers that we have a safe, accessible, and efficient pay-
ments system. Because credit and debit markets are becoming highly
important to the payments system, it is necessary—perhaps imperative—
for the Federal Reserve to monitor payments trends and inform itself, and
for central banks generally to inform themselves, about these markets.
We need to better understand these markets, and the conference, I
believe, has helped identify key questions more clearly—questions that
policymakers are in fact focusing on, as discussed in the Regulatory Panel.
We have heard about and discussed some economic theories that are
important to explaining behaviors within these markets. A growing body
of economic theory may help policymakers evaluate the behavior of the
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Many economists argue that an analysis of payments markets based on
standard economic theories is not necessarily applicable to these payments
markets. New theories of two-sided markets are being offered to provide
further insight. However, such theories are complex and are underdevel-
oped at this stage. One of the more interesting aspects of this theoretical
work is that we may not be able to say that the interchange fee that comes
out of a four-party payments system is more, less, or the same as a socially
optimal fee. Some, of course, would not agree with that conclusion.
My own observation is that until the theory is further developed, defini-
tive answers about what systems provide the best outcomes will be difficult
to assert. So, there is significant work yet to be done. Nevertheless, the point
was made—and I would agree—that we cannot wait for the theory to be
fully developed, as we must confront these very important issues now.
In addition to theory, market behavior is an important consideration.
Policymakers can examine (and in some countries, have examined) actual
market activity to evaluate whether markets are performing—in their judg-
ment—appropriately. Many attendees at the conference are direct partici-
pants in payments markets, and their comments have provided useful
insights and information on how payments markets work in today’s environ-
ment. Antitrust authorities often emphasize market behavior, including pric-
ing, output, and market structure.
Regarding pricing, one contested question is whether having interchange
fees set by card associations represents collusive behavior in setting prices.
Case law in the United States has allowed this type of cooperation, as we’ve
heard, although some now argue that ruling is perhaps out of date.
Regarding market structure, card issuers point to the significant volume
of card transactions, cardholders, and merchants that accept cards as evi-
dence of its effectiveness. Yes, this is useful evidence of a well-functioning
market. On the other hand, courts have ruled that, in some cases, card
issuers have exercised market power, and litigation has successfully chal-
lenged certain card association rules. Some observers also see sluggish inno-
vation as evidence of insufficient competition.
If economic theory is accurate in predicting that pricing is not necessarily
an informative element regarding the social welfare performance of a card
payment industry, then policymakers may need to rely more heavily on non-
price indicators. But from what I have heard at the conference, some non-
price indicators of market behavior also are open to question. Thus it may be
wise not to ignore completely levels and trends in interchange fees. Perhaps
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 most importantly, the disagreements and uncertainties shown to exist at
the conference confirm the need for more and better evidence, and there-
fore more research.
As we look at the payments market, there have been many issues raised
that deserve more attention. Do we have accurate and complete informa-
tion on price-setting practices by card associations to help determine the
degree to which there is absence of competition? We observe rising inter-
change fees in the United States and declining fees elsewhere in the world.
Is that a sign of a lack of competition, or is there a higher value proposi-
tion in the United States, as some would argue?
In terms of output, while the success of card payments suggests a well-
functioning market, a more difficult question is whether things could be bet-
ter. Of the merchants I have heard in the audience here, some have said,
“Yes,” while the card associations say, “No.” And so the dialogue continues.
Some evidence suggests that rising concentration among card issuers is giv-
ing them more market power. Yet there seems to be vigorous competition
among card issuers to obtain customers. On the other hand, we have heard
that allowing more debit and credit card issuers into the market is not neces-
sarily procompetitive. So, while market behavior is important, right now it
indicates opposing conclusions that appear to depend on one’s perspective.
We also discussed potential remedies. First, I would like to say, in terms
of remedies—and I am not the general counsel of the Federal Reserve—I
am not convinced that the Federal Reserve could simply decide to regulate
prices under the current economic environment and legal structure of the
United States. Certainly, in some other countries, analysis based on theory
and market behavior has led to the conclusions that there is failure in card
payments markets and, therefore, a need for regulatory intervention.
There is not a consensus for such intervention in the United States. It is
my experience in the United States, and you have heard this view expressed
in the Regulatory Panel, that we are very reluctant to intervene in terms of
regulating prices, unless there is an overwhelming case to be made for
doing so. We prefer to rely on the market in the United States because it
has served us well.
People hear different things when others speak, but the one thing I have
heard from all sides is that greater transparency would serve all interests
well—card company and merchant both. Perhaps that is an opportunity
for common ground from which we could start. That also would lead us,
from my perspective, to the next steps in our research agenda.
We have heard that a proper evaluation of the performance of the card
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payment industry would require statistical studies of all participants. We
need information on the benefits cardholders and merchants receive from
card payments. The Federal Reserve has done some research on consumer
preferences toward payments, but more of this research would be useful.
Depending on how much you want to rely on it, of course, more research
on the social cost of various forms of payments may be useful. But to con-
duct more research, we need more complete data on the costs that issuers,
acquirers, and networks incur when they process payments.
One of the intriguing questions posed by theory, perhaps, is how com-
petition among the different payments systems affects the performance of
individual payments systems. For a more complete understanding of this
topic, we would need similar statistics on all participants and on all forms
of retail payments—cash, checks, Automated Clearing House, and so
forth. International data also would be useful, because, as we’ve seen at this
conference, a promising avenue of research is international comparisons of
the performance of the card payment industry.
Perhaps, then, the best way to conclude this conference is to agree that
if we have a common interest, it is to search for a better understanding of
how the market works in this instance, and that requires a greater sharing
of data and information across the industry.
 